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BORDER SEARCHES REVISITED: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROPRIETY OF FIXED AND
TEMPORARY CHECKPOINT SEARCHES
By Ken Keller*
In a society that presses towards sameness and safeness, these
all too perishable qualities [independence, creativity, boldness, and
high spirits] must be given some help-they must be fostered and
nourished. . . . If I choose -to get in my car and drive somewhere,
it seems to me that where I am coming from, and where I am go-
ing, are nobody's business. . . . I think I am entitled to look for
the distant light. . . without finding myself staring into the blind-
ing beam of a police flashlight.'
Introduction
The Fourth Amendment 2 protects the people against unreason.
able searches and seizures by requiring generally both a showing of
probable cause and a warrant from a neutral magistrate before a search
and seizure may be judged reasonable.' This guarantee of protection
marks the right of privacy as one of the most unique values of our civili-
zation.4  The basic right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is so strong that it has been stated that "it is better to maintain
the right and permit the convicted defendant to go free, than to sustain
the conviction and thereby deny the right."5
There is an exception to the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment applicable to "border searches" of persons and vehicles. 7  As
* Member second year class, University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law.
1. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J 1161, 1172
(1966).
2. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tlhe right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-17 (1948).
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
5. United States v. Law, 190 F. Supp. 100, 103 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
6. Border search is a term of art used "to distinguish official searches which are
reasonable because made solely in the enforcement of Customs laws from other official
[251J
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
a result of this exception, customs and immigrations officials are exempt
from the usual probable cause and warrant requirements imposed upon
searches and seizures.
Prior to 1973, the United States Supreme Court had consistently
refused to review lower court decisions dealing with the constitution-
ality of such searches. 8 In 1973, however, the Court granted certiorari
to two Ninth Circuit cases, United States v. Johnson' and Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States,10 which both dealt with border search prob-
lems. Although -the government dropped its appeal in Johnson," the
decision in Almeida-Sanchez eroded the well-established validity of in-
land border searches by roving units of the Border Patrol which the
courts of appeal had articulated.' 2  The majority of the Court held that
such searches conducted at random within one hundred air miles of the
border were unconstitutional unless based upon probable cause.'"
After rendering the Almeida-Sanchez decision, the Court remanded
several cases' 4 dealing with the constitutional propriety of border
searches conducted some distance from the international border at
fixed and temporary checkpoints, a question which was neither ad-
searches made in connection with general law enforcement." Alexander v. United
States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966). "One point
upon which all the courts agree is that the term 'border search', as presently used, is
a misnomer. The phrase may once have designated the geographic area to which the
courts felt the Constitution confined the extraordinary authority to the Border Patrol.
Now it is merely judicial shorthand used to describe the power of border agents to search
without probable cause." Comment, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted By
Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L I .iW & POL. 93, 103
(1972).
7. See text accompanying notes 36-51 infra. See generally Winfrey, Border
Searches: An Exception to Probable Cause, 3 ST. MARY's L. REv. 87 (1917); Rempe
III, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth Amendment, 10 Apiz. L. REv. 457
(1968); Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007
(1968).
r 8. E.g., Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 977 (1966); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 936 (1963); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 950 (1961); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 939 (1959).
9. 425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 990 (1971).
10. 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
11. United States v. Johnson, 425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 400 U.S.
990, petition dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 60, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
12. For a description of the developments in the courts of appeal, see Note, In
Search of the Border, Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigrations Offi-
cers, 5 N.Y.U. 1. INT'L LAW & POL., 93 (1972).
13. See text accompanying notes 54-74 infra.
14. E.g. Miller v. United States, 414 U.S. 896 (1973), vacating, 477 F.2d 595 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Bowen, 413 U.S. 915 (1973), vacating, 462 F.2d 347 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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dressed nor answered in Almeida-Sanchez. 5
This note will include a brief discussion of alien immigration and
related law enforcement problems, the border search exception,. the
Almeida-Sanchez decision, and, finally, an evaluation of the analyses
of those courts which have considered the constitutionality of border
searches conducted at fixed and temporary checkpoints inland from the
border. In so doing, it will attempt to determine whether the provi-
sions of the Fourth Amendment are applicable to such inland check-
point searches.
The Ilegal Alien and Related Law Enforcement Problems
The Illegal Alien Problem
Through legislative action"0 the United States has placed limits
upon the number of persons who may legally immigrate into the
country in a given year. These limitations reflect the national interest
in protecting the American labor market from an unrestricted influx of
foreign labor.17
Under this policy of limited immigration, the law has established
an annual quota of 120,000 persons who may immigrate to the United
States from the independent countries of the Western Hemisphere.
Immigrants from the Republic of Mexico in the fiscal year of 1972 to-
talled 64,040 or approximately fifty-four percent of the total immigra-
tion quota.'
According to a Department of Justice report, there are an esti-
mated one million illegal aliens residing in the United States, of whom
eighty-five percent are thought to be Mexican citizens.' Since 1970,
the number of illegal Mexican aliens has been growing at a rate in ex-
cess of twenty percent per year. 0 The state of California has calcu-
lated that in 1971, when approximately 595,000 Californians were un-
employed (7.4 percent of the state's labor force), there were between
15. Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez states,
"[nior does this case involve the constitutional propriety of searches at permanent or
temporary checkpoints removed from the border or its functional equivalent. 413 U.S.
266, 276 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970).
17. See Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929).
18. 1972 IMM. & NAT. SERv. ANA. REP. 2, 28 [hereinafter cited as 72 Report].
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL STUDY GRouPs ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS FROM
Muxico, A PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIvE AND HUMANE ACTION ON ILLEGAL MEXICAN
IMMGRANTS 6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Crampton Rpt.].
19. Crampton Rpt., supra note 18, at 6.
20. CAL. STATE SocIAL WELFARE BOARD, IssuE: ALmNS IN CALIFORNIA 12, 150
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Aliens].
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200,000 and 300,000 illegal aliens in California, earning an aggregate
total of $100 million per year in wages.21
Because the majority of illegal Mexican aliens are unskilled or
low-skilled workers, they tend to compete with other minority groups
in this country. As a result of this competition, and the fact that the
percentage of unskilled or low-skilled jobs is declining relative to other
job categories, the unemployment problems associated with this labor
market have been compounded considerably.22 In addition, illegal
aliens pose potential health hazards,2 3 burden public assistance pro-
grams,24 and exacerbate the United States' balance of payments prob-
lems. 
5
The Law Enforcement Problem
The yearly influx of illegal aliens into the United States also pre-
sents a significant law enforcement problem. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) has the burden of controlling the entry
of aliens along the Mexican-American border which extends for almost
2000 miles from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast 26 Within the
INS, the task of preventing the illegal entry of aliens and the apprehen-
sion of those who have entered illegally is assigned to the 1700-person
Border Patrol.
In an attempt to maximize the effectiveness of its limited person-
nel, the Border Patrol deploys a large percentage of its agents directly
upon the physical boundary between the United States and Mexico.
2
However, such deployment is not infallible, for it is physically impos-
sible to maintain continuous surveillance over vast stretches of the bor-
der.2 9  In addition, the Border Patrol, pursuant to statutory authority,30
has conducted three types of inland searches for illegal aliens:3  1)
21. Hearings on Illegal Aliens Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 150 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
22. Crampton Rpt., supra note 18, at 12.
23. Immigration and medical officers in Los Angeles, for example, have discovered
that the illegal alien population in the Los Angeles barrio is infected with a high inci-
dence of typhoid, tuberculosis, tapeworms, venereal disease and hepatitis. United States
v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 403 (S.D. Cal. 1973), quoting L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1973,
pt. II, at 1.
24. Aliens, supra note 20, at 35 & 43.
25. Hearings, supra note 21, at 208.
26. 72 Report, supra note 18, at 1.
27. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERvIcE, THE BORDER PATROL; ITS ORIGIN
AND ITs WoK 1 (1965).
28. Id. at 10.
29. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 293 (1973) (White, I.,
dissenting).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 135 (1964); see note 38 infra and accompanying text,
31t 413 U.S. gt 2%
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searches at permanent checkpoints maintained at certain nodal inter-
sections;32 2) searches at temporary checkpoints established from time
to time at various places; and 3) searches carried out by roving patrols.
The purpose of such searches is to question "vehicle occupants believed
to be aliens, as to their right to be, or to remain, in the United States,
and also to search such vehicles for illegal aliens."'33  During 1972,
these inland checking operations located over 39,000 deportable aliens,
of whom approximately 30,000 had entered the United States by ile-
gally crossing the border at a place other than a port of entry. 4
In recognition of the illegal alien and related law enforcement
problems Congress and the courts have given "almost continuous atten-
tion. . . to the problem of immigration and excludability of certain de-
fined classes of aliens. The pattern has generally been one of increas-
ing control. . . .,3 Such "attention" resulted in the development of
the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The Border Search Exception
Beginning with the first border search statute enacted in 1789,16
Congress has granted customs officials the authority to stop and ex-
amine any vehicle, person or baggage arriving in the United States on
suspicion that merchandise is concealed which is subject to duty or
which cannot be legally imported into the United States."7 Similarly,
32. The primary factors in selecting the site of a permanent checkpoint are:
1. A location on a highway just between the confluence of two or more roads from
the border. Such a site minimizes the inconvenience of commuter or urban traffic while
permitting the checking of a large volume of traffic with a minimum number of officers.
2. Terrain and topography which restrict passage around the checkpoint.
3. Safety factors such as unobstructed view of oncoming traffic to provide a safe
distance for slowing and stopping the vehicles to be inspected with sufficient area for
vehicles not requiring inspection to pass. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 406
(S.D. Cal. 1973).
33. 413 U.S. at 294 n.6 (White, J., dissenting).
34. 72 Report, supra note 18, at 1-8. In the fiscal year 1972, 398,000 aliens who
had entered the United States without inspection were located by INS officers; and of
the 39,243 deportable aliens located through checking operations, about one-third,
11,586, had been assisted by smugglers. Ninety-nine percent of all aliens illegally enter-
ing the United States by land had crossed the border with Mexico. Id.
35. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1972).
36. Act of July 31, 1789; ch. 5, 1 Stat. 43 (1789) which provided "[t]hat every
collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of
them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel,
in which they have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty
shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares,
or merchandise." (emphasis added).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) provides:
"Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle,
iter 19751
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immigration officials have statutory authorization to conduct searches
for illegally entered aliens within a reasonable distance, currently de-
fined as 100 air miles, from the border without probable cause to be-
lieve illegal aliens are present.3 8  In 1971, immigration and customs
search activities were merged when Border Patrol agents became em-
powered to act as customs agents. 9 At first, it was thought that the
standards for determining the validity of searches made by the Border
Patrol would be difficult to reconcile since Border Patrol agents in pur-
suit of illegal aliens were empowered to make warrantless searches
within one hundred miles of the border, whereas warrantless searches
by customs agents sixty -to seventy miles from the border were ruled
illegal.40 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
McDaniel addressed this issue of what standard should be applied to
the two searches:
[The] Border Patrol agents wear two hats, one as an immigra-
tion officer and the other as a customs officer. The agents testified
that they had planned to wear their immigration hats that night,
but we find nothing in the statutes that would preclude them from
later donning their customs hat during a proper border search.
41
Although the McDaniel court's metaphorical analysis is not unassail-
able, the Fifth Circuit's "two hats" approach has been consistently up-
held and followed in recent years.
42
Practically, the border search exception is justified by the "pecul-
iar and difficult law enforcement problems that are necessarily pre-
sented by the effective policing of our extensive national boundaries.
43
Conceptually, the courts have based their validation of border searches
beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which
is subject to duty or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to the laws whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon
such a vehicle or beast or otherwise. . . ." (emphasis added).
38. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1964):
"Any officer or employee of the service authorized under regulations prescribed by
the Attorney General shall have the power without warrant...
3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,
to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United
States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance or vehicle. . . ." Reasonable distance
is defined 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1967) as 100 air miles from any external boundary, or
any shorter distance fixed by the district director.
39. 36 Fed. Reg. 13,410 (1971).
40. See comment, 51 J. URBAN LAw, 535, 558 (1974).
41. 463 F.2d 129, 134 (Sth Cir. 1972).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Settles, 481 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359
(5th Cir. 1973).
43. King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
926 (1965). See text accompanying notes 26-35 supra; United States v. Glaziou, 402
F,2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968); Morales v, United States, 378 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1967).
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on the nation's inherent sovereign power to protect its territorial integ-
rity against the intrusion of unauthorized persons or things. The
United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States upheld the
warrantless search of an automobile by prohibition agents, stating:
Travellers may be stopped in crossing an international boundary
because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one enter-
ing the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those
lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways,
have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless
there is known to a competent official authorized to search, prob-
able cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband
or illegal merchandise. .... 44
Although Carroll spoke of stopping travellers only "in crossing an
international boundary", courts have held that a border search need not
be conducted solely at a point of entry.45 To be classified as a border
search, it must be "reasonably certain" from an examination of all the
circumstances surrounding the search that any contraband found aboard
a vehicle was there at the time of entry. 8
However, recent cases appear to have shifted their emphasis away
from reasonable certainty that the contents of a vehicle were present
at the time of entry. The rule, as set forth in United States v. Weil,
now seems to be that
if customs agents are reasonably certain that the parcels have been
a) smuggled across the border and b) placed in a vehicle, whether
the vehicle itself crossed the border or not, they may stop and
search the vehicle. Similarly, if agents are reasonably certain that
a person has crossed the border illegally, and has then entered a
vehicle on this side of the border, we think they may stop and
search the vehicle and person. They can assume that he may have
brought something with him.
47
This formulation suggests that in order to justify a search of an automo-
bile at any other place -than the immediate border area, the border
44. 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623
(1886).
45. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); United States v. Mejias, 452 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir.
1971); Castillo-Garcia v. United States, 424 F.2d 482, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1970).
46. In Alexander, supra, the court stated that "[w]here . . . a search for contra-
band by Customs officers is not made at or in the immediate vicinity of the point of
international border crossing, the legality of the search must be tested by a determina-
tion whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the time and dis-
tance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of surveillance, are such as to convince
the fact finder with reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be found in
or on the vehicle at the time of the search was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry
into the jurisdiction of the United States." 362 F.2d at 382.
47. 432 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971).
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agents must have reason to believe that parcels or individuals are being
brought illegally into this country. In short, a degree of reasonable
cause to search is required, though less than the traditional probable
cause.
48
It was against this history49 that the United States Supreme Court
on June 21, 1973, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,5" took the first
step toward curtailing the theretofore unbridled authority of the Border
Patrol to stop and search vehicles within 100 miles of the border with-
out a warrant or traditional probable cause.
The Almeida-Sanchez Decision
Defendant Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican citizen, was travelling on
a highway about 25 air miles north of the Mexican border when he
was stopped by a roving Border Patrol unit looking for aliens illegally
entering the United States. The agents stopped him even though they
had neither a warrant nor probable cause to believe that the defendant's
car was carrying illegal aliens. 1 Although the defendant quickly pro-
duced a valid work permit, the agents nevertheless proceeded to re-
move the back seat of his car. Instead of finding illegal aliens, the
officers discovered 162 pounds of marijuana. The trial court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was the product
of an illegal search and Almeida-Sanchez was convicted of transport-
ing illegally imported marijuana. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed his conviction.
5 3
By a 5-4 majority, the United States Supreme Court overruled the
lower courts' decisions and held that such searches cannot be conducted
if the roving Border Patrol unit has neither a warrant nor probable
cause to stop the automobile in question.54 In so holding, the majority
distinguished the search in question from that which the Court had up-
48. Decisions of the Courts of Appeal of the Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits
convey the same impression. See Stassi v. United States, 410 F.2d 946, 951-52 (5th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1121 (1969); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968). See
also Harris v. United States, 400 U.S. 1211 (1970).
49. For a more thorough discussion of the border search exception see note, In
Search of the Border, Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigrations Offi-
cers, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAw & POL. 93 (1972); Winfrey, Border Searches: An Excep-
tion to Probable Cause, 3 ST. MARY's L.J. 87 (1971); Note, Search and Seizure at the
Border: The Border Search, 21 RUTGERS L. Rv. 513 (1967).
50. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
51. Id. at 268.
52. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (products of illegal
search excluded from evidence in criminal prosecution).
53. 425 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
54. 413 U.S. at 273.
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held in Carroll v. United States.5 5 In Carroll there was probable cause
for the search based upon personal contact and prior surveillance of
the defendants. In Almeida-Sanchez, the search was made at random
and -the agents had no reason to believe that the petitioner's car was
any more likely to be carrying aliens than any other vehicle travelling
in the area. Hence, the search of the "petitioner's car was [not] consti-
tutional under any other decision of the Court involving this search of
an automobile."-5 6
The Court further disregarded the government's reliance upon
cases dealing with administrative inspections in which similar searches
had been upheld.57 In Camara v. Municipal Court,5s the United States
Supreme Court had held that administrative inspections to enforce
health and welfare regulations could be made on less than probable
cause to believe that particular dwellings were the sites of particular
violations. 9 However, the Court insisted that the inspectors obtain
either the consent of the occupant or a general area-wide warrant.""
The search in Almeida-Sanchez was both warrantless and based upon
the unfettered discretion of the patrolmen. Thus, the search "em-
bodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that
the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining
a warrant prior to the inspection." 61
The Court also distinguished its opinions in the cases of Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States62 and United States v. Biswel 68 in
which it upheld warrantless inspections of commercial enterprises en-
gaged in businesses closely regulated and licensed by the Govern-
ment.64 In those cases "the businessmen engaged in such federally li-
censed and regulated enterprises accept[ed] the burdens as well as the
benefits of their trade."6 5 Almeida-Sanchez, however, was not a busi-
nessman engaged in a "regulated or licensed business" but was a pri-
vate citizen lawfully travelling upon a public highway. Therefore, the
prosecution's reliance upon such inspections for the search in question
was unfounded. 8
55. Id. at 269-70. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
56. 413 U.S. at 269.
57. Id. at 270-72.
58. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Accord, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
59. 387 U.S. at 534-36, 538.
60. Id.
61. 413 U.S. at 270, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33
(1967).
62. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
63. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
64. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77; United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312 n.1, 315-16.
65. 413 U.S. at 271.
66. See Id. at 270.
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The Court refused to uphold the search solely upon the statutory
authority granted to the Border Patrol to conduct roving searches, even
-though the government demonstrated that the highway in question was
a common route for illegally entered aliens to travel, and one on which
195 aliens had been apprehended in the previous year. 67  Although
the Court recognized the government's power to exclude aliens from
this country and the difficulty of "deterring unlawful entry by aliens
across long expanses of national boundaries,"6 such power, in the
Court's opinion, only allows the government to make routine roving
searches of individuals and conveyances at the border itself or its "func-
tional equivalent."'6 9 The Court found that
the search of the petitioner's automobile by a roving patrol, on a
California road that lies at all points at least 20 miles north of the
Mexican border, was of a wholly different sort. In the absence
of probable cause or consent, that search violated the petitioner's
Fourth Amendment right to be free of 'unreasonable searches and
seizures.'
70
The Court's analysis in Almeida-Sanchez ended the trend estab-
lished by lower federal courts toward condoning expansions of govern-
ment agents' power to conduct warrantless searches based solely upon
statutory authority. 71 With the broad discretion of the Border Patrol
eliminated, at least with respect to searches conducted by roving pa-
trols, "[tihe one hundred mile zone is now like any other area inside
the national boundaries; the agents must have probable cause to stop
and search automobiles. z7 2  Lower courts must now for the first time
apply familiar Fourth Amendment principles to determine the constitu-
tionality of searches at points near the border but not at the border itself
or its functional equivalent. The policy underlying this change was suc-
cinctly stated by Mr. Justice Stewart writing for the majority in
Almeida-Sanchez:
The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises
of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pres-
sures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.
73
67. Id. at 273 n.5.
68. Id. at 273.
69. Id. Searches conducted at the functional equivalent of the border include, for
example, a search at "an established station near the border, at a point marking the con-
fluence of two or more roads that extend from the border . . . [or] a search of pas-
sengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St Louis airport after a nonstop flight
from Mexico City ......
70. 413 U.S. at 273.
71. Id. at 268.
72. Note, Right to be Free from Warrantless Searches at the Border, Almeida-San-
chez v. United States, 51 J. URBAN LAw 556, 562 (1974).
73. 413 U.S. at 273.
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Although the Court in Almeida-Sanchez declared that searches
conducted by roving units of the Border Patrol pursuant neither to a
warrant nor probable cause were unconstitutional as noted above,74 the
decision did not consider the constitutional propriety of similar searches
conducted at fixed or temporary checkpoints inland from the border.
However, several lower federal courts have directly considered this is-
sue in light of the Almeida-Sanchez decision and have relied heavily
upon the Supreme Court's analysis.
Fixed and Temporary Inland Checkpoint Searches
Pre-Almeida-Sanchez
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-
Sanchez, there was no indication from any of the lower federal courts
that searches conducted inland from the border at fixed and temporary
checkpoints were unconstitutional.75 On the contrary, in -the three cir-
cuits involved in enforcing -the immigration laws along the Mexican bor-
der, thirty-five out of thirty-six appellate judges who had considered the
constitutional propriety of searches conducted at fixed or temporary in-
land checkpoints had upheld such searches.7 6  This judicial response
did not rest on a comprehensive, critical analysis of the differences be-
tween searches conducted at international boundaries and those con-
ducted at a distance from the border; rather, the law concerning such
searches developed on a case-by-case basis. The decisions were based
upon the aforementioned statutory provisions which, as noted above,
77
authorize immigration officials to conduct warrantless searches of ve-
hicles for illegal aliens within one hundred air miles of an international
boundary. Under -the "two hats" doctrine articulated in McDaniel,
once a vehicle has been validly stopped for an immigration search, if
the Border Patrol/customs agents detect circumstances supporting the
belief that customs laws are being violated, they may don -their customs
hats and complete the search to determine if contraband is being trans-
ported.
78
Prior to the 1971 merger of search authorizations of the Border
Patrol and customs agents, in Contreras v. United States,79 an immigra-
tion inspector made a routine check for illegal aliens at a fixed check-
point about 72 miles north of the Mexican border. Spotting a paper
sack in the back seat of the detained automobile, the inspector peered
74. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 79-92 infra.
76. 413 U.S. 266, 298-99 n.10 (White, J., dissenting).
77. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
78. United States v. Byrd, 483 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1973).
79. 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961).
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into the bag and saw a quantity of marijuana. In view of the fact that
the car was stopped for the purpose of checking the nationality of its
occupants, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction, stating that there was
no logical connection between the examination of the sack and the
determination of the appellants' citizenship, or the citizenship of
any other occupant of the car ...
If the search cannot be justified as a reasonable means of de-
termining the citizenship status of the car's occupants, it cannot be
justified in any other way under the rubric of "probable cause."80
In 1963, two years after Contreras, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals once again faced the question of the constitutional propriety of
fixed checkpoint searches in Fernandez v. United States.81  Appellant
was stopped at a fixed checkpoint 60 to 70 miles north of the Mexican
border and questioned as to his citizenship and point of origin. When
he replied that he was an alien from Mexico, the Border Patrol directed
him to pull over to the side of the road for further questioning. At
this point, one of the immigration officials smelled an odor, which he
thought was marijuana, emanating from under the hood of the appel-
lant's car. The officers ordered the appellant to open the hood under
which they discovered five packages of marijuana. At the trial, the
investigating officer testified that he had previously discovered an alien
concealed under the hood of a car.
In upholding the appellant's conviction, the court held that the ini-
tial detention of the appellant was proper under the statutory provisions
concerning immigration searches.82 In addition, the court felt that
clearly there was probable cause for making the search of the appel-
lant's car without a warrant since, having smelled the odor of marijuana
coming from the vehicle in the appellant's possession, it was reasonable
for the inspector to conclude that a crime was being committed.83  Al-
though the court in Fernandez was able to distinguish Contreras on this
basis,8 4 i.e., that the officer had probable cause, clearly there was an-
80. Id. at 66.
81. 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), 321 F.2d at 285-86 (1970). Accord, Barba-Reyes v.
United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
83. 321 F.2d at 287. The development of alien searches at fixed checkpoints fol-
lowed a similar pattern in the Tenth Circuit. See United States v. Anderson, 468 F.2d
1280 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972);
Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969). But the Fifth Circuit
created an expandible border concept that had only tangential r.-lationship to the law
emerging from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. See United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1972); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965).
84. The court distinguished Contreras since in the present case the inspector was
f miliar with the odor of marijuana andl when he 5mefle4 uch an odor emanating from
[Vol. 2
BORDER SEARCHES REVISITED
other distinction, that of the size of the area searched, which later courts
have deemed significant.
In Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States,"5 immigration officers had
fruitlessly searched the appellant's car at the border itself. He was
stopped once again at a fixed checkpoint 48 miles from the border and
was asked to open the trunk of his car, when, as the agent later testi-
fied, the appellant appeared to be extrmely nervous. Upon inspec-
tion, the officer noted that although the floor of the trunk was dirty,
the side panels "were clean or had been moved. '8 6 Upon a closer in-
spection, -the officer found packages of marijuana in a six-inch space
behind the side panel.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the appellant's con-
viction, finding that it was unlikely that the inspector could have main-
tained any reasonable belief that an alien was secreted in -the six-inch
space between the trunk panel and the car wall. 7 The court felt that
the appellant's nervousness and the lack of dust on the trunk panels
were not sufficient probable cause to indicate that an offense was being
committed.88  Hence, the court held that the search was unconstitu-
tional.8 9
At the time of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Almeida-Sanchez, the original stop and brief detention at a fixed or
temporary inland checkpoint for the purpose of limited inquiry as to
the person's citizenship were constitutionally permissible 0 Similarly,
the courts were willing to uphold any search of an area sufficient to
conceal an alien.9 But, if the search went beyond that reasonably re-
lated to the discovery of aliens, probable cause was required to validate
a warrantless search.92
under the hood of the car, he had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was
in possession of marijuana. 321 F.2d at 287 n.7.
85. 425 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1970).
86. Id. at 1171.
87. Id. at 1172.
88. Id.
89. Accord, United States v. Lujan-Romero, 469 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1971) (search
of two foot lockers); Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969)
(search of jacket); United States v. Winer, 294 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Texas, 1969)
(search under the seat of a small automobile).
90. See United States v. Barron, 472 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.s.
920 (1973); United States v. Oswald, 441 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1971).
91. See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
92. Even after the Almeida-Sanchez decision, the Tenth Circuit appears to follow
the test developed by the Ninth Circuit prior to Almeida-Sanchez: the initial stop at
the checkpoint and inquiry as to citizenship may be made without a warrant or probable
cause; but if the officer is going to search beyond what is in plain view, he must have
probable cause or be at the functional equivalent of the border. This latter requirement
is derived from Almeida-Sanchez. See United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th
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Post-Anlmeida-Sanchez
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-
Sanchez that searches conducted by roving patrols, with neither a war-
rant nor probable cause -to believe a crime was being committed, are
unconstitutional, several lower federal courts have attempted to apply
the reasoning of Almeida-Sanchez to determine the constitutional pro-
priety of searches conducted at fixed and temporary checkpoints inland
from the border. Though a brief fixed checkpoint search is probably
less offensive than a roving patrol search, and being asked to stop at
a fixed checkpoint is potentially less traumatic than being flagged over
on a lonely road in a sparsely populated area,9 3 the border agent at a
fixed checkpoint still retains a good deal of discretion to single out and
search certain travellers. 94 Thus, defendants have challenged such
searches as being unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Speed96 re-
jected the contention that a roving patrol differs from a fixed check-
point with regard to border searches.97  Immigration officers stopped
the appellants at a temporary checkpoint located 70 miles from the bor-
der. The Border Patrol frequently used this location because it has
proven particularly effective in the past in revealing illegal aliens and
contraband. The highway on which this checkpoint was located ran
north to south through a sparsely populated area.
The Speed court held that the Border Patrors search was essen-
tially identical to the search conducted in Almeida-Sanchez, notwith-
standing the fact that the search was conducted at a temporary check-
point. For the search to be constitutional, the court held that
[the] searching officer must know or have a reasonable suspicion
Cir. 1973); United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mad-
dox, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973).
93. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1974).
94. Id. In United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 1974), an im-
migration agent, who was stopping cars 700 miles from the border, admitted that he was
"just indiscriminately stopping cars." Clearly the fact that the search took place 700
miles from the border precludes consideration that this was a border search. However,
this case does lend an insight into the arbitrary nature often existent in the detention
of people at fixed and temporary checkpoints. The agent himself testified that the ap-
pellant did not possess any characteristics which led him to believe that they were of
Mexican descent, that he had never seen their truck before, that there had been no prior
surveillance, nor any suspicious behavior. Although the agent's activity was not "per
se" unreasonable, it could not be escalated to frustrate the Fourth Amendment. To do
so "would effectively authorize the search of each and every vehicle passing through this
checkpoint with a border state license plate and sufficient capacity to conceal a human
body; the inherent potential for abuse ... is virtually unlimited." Id.
95. See text accompanying notes 96-109 infra.
96. 489 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1973).
97. Id. at 480.
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that the very individual or the thing to be searched has itself just
crossed the border. Judicial notice or even proof of many illegal
acts in the area in which the search takes place is not enough. 98
The only connection to the border which could justify this search was
the statutory power granted to the Border Patrol to conduct such
searches and the fact that similar searches in the area had produced
evidence of illegal activity, that is, the illegal importation of marijuana.
Since "[n]either a Congressional statute nor praise for the results of
a certain investigative technique can justify an otherwise illegal
search,"'99 the court declared the search unconstitutional. Essential to
its holding was the fact that
[h]ere there was too great an interference with internal, domestic
highway traffic to justify the search as a border search in spite of
the fact that the road eventually crossed the border. We are not
willing to subject every resident of the area between the . . .
checkpoint and the border to virtually unrestricted searches when-
ever they use their automobiles. 100
Although the Ninth Circuit has not totally disregarded the distinc-
tion between roving patrol searches and those conducted at fixed and
temporary checkpoints, it has held that fixed checkpoint searches,
though conducted within a "reasonable distance" from the border, are
not necessarily exempt from the traditional Fourth Amendment re-
quirement of a warrant or probable cause. 10 1 In the case of United
States v. Bowen,'0 2 the appellant was stopped at a fixed checkpoint 49
miles from the Mexican border, located between the population centers
of Imperial Valley and Indio.108 At this checkpoint, the operations en-
tailed stopping for inquiry approximately 75 percent of all vehicles
travelling north, and detaining for further inspection 10-15 percent of
all vehicles stopped. During the first ten months of 1973, immigration
officers apprehended approximately 730 deportable aliens at this
checkpoint.1
0 4
The government in Bowen attempted to justify the search of the
appellant's camper with arguments similar to those presented in




101. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. Id.
103. Imperial Valley has a population of 3,400 people; Indio has a population of
17,400 people. CALIF. RosTma, 1973-74, at 101.
104. United states v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 413 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
105. The government in Almeida-Sanchez had sought to justify roving patrol
searches on the basis of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a). "Here [in
Bowen] the government seeks to justify the fixed checkpoint search by reference to the
same statute and regulation as the court in Almeida-Sanchez." 500 F.2d at 965.
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Sanchez leaves little doubt that traditional Fourth Amendment stand-
ards apply to fixed checkpoint searches as well as roving patrol
searches."' 10 6 Hence, unless the search in question took place at the
border or its "functional equivalent", it was unconstitutional. The
search was not at the border itself. Nor was it at the "functional equiv-
alent" of the border, that is, at a location where virtually everyone
searched has just come from the other side of the border.10" The
checkpoint was located 49 miles north of the border with several sig-
nificant population centers and highways lying between it and the bor-
der. Thus, the "border patrol agents had no reason to believe that vir-
tually all or even most of the cars passing through their checkpoint had
recently, or ever, crossed the border.' 08 The court held that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment since it was not conducted at
the functional equivalent of the border, 0 9 authorized by a warrant, nor
prompted by circumstances giving the agent probable cause to believe
that a crime was being committed.
Possible Justification for Inland Searches at Fixed and Temporary
Checkpoints Which Meet Fourth Amendment Requirements
The courts which decided Bowen and Speed did not attempt to
analyze thoroughly the issue of the possible justification of fixed check-
point searches through a comparison with certain other types of
searches which courts have found to be constitutionally permissible."10
The Bowen dissent did argue that "[a] careful analysis of areas where
such searches have been upheld as reasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment demonstrates persuasive reasons for the same
approach in testing the constitutionality of stops and searches at fixed
106. 500 F.2d at 962-63.
107. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
108. 500 F.2d at 966. Moreover the court held that the search could not be justi-
fied under the pre-Almeida-Sanchez case authority. There was neither the continuing
surveillance from the border nor the dependable intelligence from other sources neces-
sary to satisfy the Alexander test (see text accompanying notes 45-47 supra) nor the
reasonable certainty that the vehicle contained either recently smuggled goods or aliens
necessary to satisfy the Weil test (see text accompanying notes 47-48 supra). 500 F.2d
at 965-67.
109. But see United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 417 (S.D. Cal. 1973) where
the court stated that this checkpoint was situated at a point with one of the lowest vol-
umes of traffic on that highway, thus tending to cause little intrusio and inconvenience
to travellers, as well as scarcely impeding the goal of safe driving. Furthermore, it
lay only 36 miles from the border and it had been estimated that over one half of the
vehicles reaching the checkpoint came directly from Mexico. Accordingly, the check-
point was considered to be at the functional equivalent of the border.
110. The Bowen court did consider the question of whether vehicle inspection stops
could be the basis for justification of inland border searches, but its consideration of this
issue was linited. 500 F,2d at 964.
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checkpoints." ' Yet, such a careful analysis offers little, if any, pos-
sible justification. Four types of constitutionally approved searches
based upon less than traditional probable cause have been proposed
as analogies which would justify searches at fixed checkpoints: 1) stop
and frisk; 2) airport searches; 3) vehicle inspection stops; and 4) ad-
ministrative inspections.
Stop and Frisk
In Terry v. Ohio,"12 the United States Supreme Court held that
a police officer may conduct a limited "patdown" search for weapons
when he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal conduct has
taken or is taking place and that the person he searches is armed and
dangerous. "The sole justification [for such a] search . . . is the pro-
tection of the police officer and others nearby."' 3
In justifying such a search the Court applied a test that balanced
the interests of the individual in being free from invasions of his per-
sonal privacy against the interests of society in assuring the safety of
its law enforcement officers. However, searches for illegal aliens hid-
den in the trunks of automobiles clearly cannot be justified by claiming
that such a search is for the "protection of the police officer and others
nearby." Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez, rec-
ognized this difference between the stop and frisk and the roving patrol
search and stated that "[niothing in Terry supports an exception to the
[Fourth Amendment] warrant requirement in the cases of border
searches." 4  To hold otherwise would invite police behavior specifi-
cally condemned by the Fourth Amendment." 5 In roving patrol
searches, the officer frequently confronts the person on a lonely desert
road where his safety obviously may be in danger. Such is not the case
when he searches in a well-lit fixed checkpoint. If the Terry justifica-
tion is lacking in the former, as we must infer from the Almeida-
Sanchez result, it must also be lacking in the latter if the officer's pro-
tection is the primary consideration.
Airport Searches
Another example of a judicially-approved search based upon less
than traditional probable cause is the limited search to which all persons
111. Id. at 971 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
112. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Accord, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
113. 392 U.S. at 29.
114. 413 U.S. at 280 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d
893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973) (Terry inapposite to validity of preboarding screening of air-
line passengers and luggage).
115. Comment, Applying Constitutional Standards to Airport Security Searches, 5
LOYOLA U.LJ. (Chicago) 186, 201 (1974).
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are subjected prior to entering airline boarding areas.! 16 In justifying
such searches, courts have balanced distinct and competing policy in-
terests. The government, the airlines and the travelling public have
a significant interest in preventing airline highjackings. 117 The threat
to life and property associated with highjackings is substantial. The
highjacking problem is further complicated by the difficulty of ferreting
out potential highjackers before they commit the crime.11 8 Balanced
against the public interest is the individual's interest in freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Courts have justified airport searches by finding that the pre-
vention of possible loss of life is of greater importance than an individ-
ual's freedom from a limited search.119 With regard to border
searches, the public and government are basically interested in restrict-
ing the influx of illegal aliens for economic reasons.120 The illegal
alien problem, unlike the highjacking problem, involves little, if any,
possibility of loss of life if the alien is not apprehended at the time of
his entry.
One of the primary judicial criteria for the justification of airport
searches is that the essential purpose of the search must not be to detect
contraband or to apprehend criminals, but "to deter persons carrying
weapons or explosives from seeking to board the plane."'' In con-
trast, "the primordial purpose of a search by Customs officers [and un-
der the "two hats" doctrine, immigration officers as well] is . . . to
seize contraband property unlawfully imported or brought into the
United States.' 22 Hence, the criterion used by courts to justify airport
searches is noticeably absent in searches at fixed and temporary check-
points inland from the border. A comparison between the two is,
therefore, of questionable validity.
Vehicle Inspection Stops
A third type of search which courts have upheld when based upon
116. See generally Comment, Airport Searches: Fourth Amendment Anomolies, 48
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1043 (1973); Comment, 5 LOYOLA U.LJ. (Chicago) 186 (1973).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771-72 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
118. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1973).
119. 454 F.2d at 772. Nevertheless, such searches have been called "probably the
most widespread and most constant violations ever of the Fourth [Amendment] . .. .
Comment, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1043, 1043 (1973).
120. See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
121. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973).
122. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 977 (1966) [emphasis added]. See, e.g., Klein v. United States. 472 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1973); The Atlantice, 68 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933); United States %. Baca, 368 F. Supp.
398, 406 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
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less than probable cause is that of routine, random vehicle inspections
conducted at fixed and temporary roadblocks.' 23 Motor vehicles may
be stopped for safety and other regulatory inspections, 12 4 for weigh-
ing,125 and to check the validity of the operator's driver's license.1
20
Courts do not consider contraband found incident to such stops to be
the subject of an illegal search.127
State v. Severance128 was a test case which challenged the consti-
tutionality of the practice of road checks by the state police in which
all motorists in one lane of traffic were stopped for routine inspections
to ascertain whether the operator had a valid license and the motor ve-
hicle was duly registered. Rather than justifying such a practice by
claiming, as previous courts had done,'29 that a motor vehicle license
is a privilege, not a right, 30 the court held that a road check for the
good faith purpose of inspecting motor vehicle licenses and registration
certificates is a constitutionally valid method of enforcing public safety
so long as the road check is not used as a subterfuge for uncovering
evidence of other crimes.' 31 Essential to the holding was the steadily
increasing number of violations and fatal accidents involving unlicensed
drivers. The court felt that holding such searches illegal would seri-
ously impair the objective of promoting public safety and responsible
automobile operation.'32
Motor vehicle and driver licensing laws are grounded upon safety
considerations and apply to all vehicles and drivers within the state.
Since violations of such laws are as likely to occur in one place as an-
other, a state acts reasonably to achieve the laws' public safety purpose
123. See, e.g., United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1970); People
v. Washburn, 265 Cal. App. 2d 665, 670, 71 Cal. Rptr. 557, 581 (2d Dist. 1968); State
v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968). But see Commonwealth v. Swanger,
453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973) in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the routine check of a motor vehicle to determine whether it and its operator were
properly licensed violates the Fourth Amendment. See generally Note, Nonarrest Auto-
mobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REV. 865, 882
(1973), where upon balancing the interests involved the author concluded that such
stops may be unconstitutional; Comment, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automo-
biles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835 (1974).
124. 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1970); 49 C.F.R. § 396.5 (1970).
125. Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802, 122 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. App. 1938).
126. See cases cited note 123 supra.
127. Id.
128. 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968).
129. State v. Smolen, 4 Conn. Cir. 385, 394, 232 A.2d 339, 342-44 (App. Div.),
pet. for certification for appeal denied, 231 A.2d 283 (Conn. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1044 (1968).
130. 108 N.H. at 407-08, 237 A.2d at 685-86.
131. Id. at 686.
132. Id. at 407, 237 A.2d at 685.
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when it establishes vehicle inspection checkpoints at locations scattered
throughout the state. As the Severance court recognized, if states
could not so act, enforcement of their motor vehicle and licensing laws
would be seriously impaired.
The factors which have led courts to uphold vehicle inspection
stops are not present in inland border searches. First, as was pre-
viously discussed,"3' the illegal alien problem in and of itself does not
involve immediate danger to life.' While a community does have an
interest in protecting its economic resources from depletion by illegal
aliens, such an economic interest is not sufficient to cause courts to re-
strict Fourth Amendment rights. Secondly, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has rejected the argument that the laws prohibiting illegal im-
migration will be rendered unenforceable should the courts deny the
state the power to stop and search automobiles for illegal aliens at fixed
checkpoints inland from the border without probable cause or war-
rant.1 5
Those lawfully within this country are entitled to use public high-
ways without interruption unless there is probable cause to believe that
their vehicles are carrying contraband.130 It seems unreasonable to al-
low border searches without probable cause within one hundred miles
of the border merely because the government asserts that inspections
conducted solely at the border are inadequate to effectuate the pur-
poses of the immigrations and customs statutes.13 7 No estimates have
been made of the incremental costs of the intensified border inspections
which would be needed to secure the same level of detection presently
achieved through a combination of border and inland searches. Nor
has there been a study of the extent to which illegal aliens who are
not picked up at other than inland border searches undermine or defeat
the basic purpose of congressional regulation of alien entry. Until such
determinations have been made, one cannot conclude that inland
searches at fixed and temporary checkpoints are a necessary element
of the most effective means of achieving the desired level of security.
Administrative Inspections
The fourth and final attempted justification for inland checkpoint
searches is drawn from the administrative search exception to the
Fourth Amendment's requirement sanctioned by the United States Su-
preme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court.3 8  The Court in Camara
133. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
135. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 1974).
136. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
137. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
138. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Accord, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
[Vol. 2
approved the grant of area warrants to search buildings whose occu-
pants had refused admission to a housing inspector who was looking
for evidence of housing code violations. The Court held that such war-
rants may issue even when there is not probable cause to believe that
a particular building contains such violations, so long as the general
characteristics-such as the nature of the building or the condition of
the entire area-indicate that violations may be present."89 The Court
relied upon three factors in relaxing the probable cause requirement
of the Fourth Amendment: 1) a long history of judicial and public ac-
ceptance of the practice; 2) the likelihood that there was no other ac-
ceptable way of promoting the public interest involved; and 3) the lim-
ited invasion of privacy occasioned by inspections which were neither
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime. 40 I
Inland checkpoint searches for aliens do not evidence all three of
these factors. The first factor appears to be satisfied, for the history
of public reaction to such searches indicates no sizeable protest against
the practice. Likewise, judicial reaction has been one of almost total
acceptance until 1973.14' Notwithstanding this history of public and
judicial acceptance, application of the two remaining Camara factors to
checkpoint searches reveals certain problems with the traditional ac-
ceptance of inland searches.
Control over entry of aliens is considered to reflect a policy of ma-
jor public importance and, correspondingly, the illegal entry of aliens
is a serious problem.' 42  Because the government has never attempted
to establish the feasibility or test the effectiveness of less drastic alterna-
tives to these invasive searches, it is impossible to gauge the adequacy
of alternative technique of control. 43 It is possible that intensification
of inspections directly at the border and/or penalization of employers
who hire aliens without valid work permits could achieve the same level
of effectiveness as the combination of border and inland searches. Un-
til such a determination is made it cannot be said with certainty that
there is no other way of promoting this important public interest than
by searches conducted at inland checkpoints.
The third factor emphasized by the Camara Court was the limited
nature of the inspections which were neither personal nor directed at
the discovery of incriminating evidence. It is doubtful that a search
139. 387 U.S. at 534-39. See generally LaFave, Administrative Searches and the
Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. Cr. REV. 1 (1967).
140. 387 U.S. at 537.
141. See text accompanying notes 75-92 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
143. See text following note 137 supra.
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by Border Patrol agents at an inland checkpoint can be characterized
as an administrative one directed primarily to regulation and as only
incidental to the detection of crime.144 Illegally transporting a person
into the United States is a crime punishable by a $2000 fine and five
years imprisonment. 145 When the agent questions a motorist as to his
right to be in the United States and searches his vehicle for aliens, he
is attempting to establish the commission of a crime.
Although the administrative search exception does not justify in-
land border searches at fixed and temporary checkpoints, the Camara
decision does suggest a viable and potentially less intrusive alternative
to this procedure.
The Area Warrant Alternative
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in Almeida-Sanchez, suggested that
the Camara decision may indicate an alternative technique for the utili-
zation of the Border Patrol to control illegal alien traffic.146 The tech-
nique-use of area warrants-might reconcile the seriousness of the
immigration problem with the necessity of safeguarding persons against
unreasonable searches and seizures in a manner compatible with prior
decisions of the Court. 4 7 Justice Powell noted that
[n]othing in the papers before [the Court] demonstrates that it
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain advance ju-
dicial approval of the decision to conduct. . . searches on a par-
ticular road. . for a reasonable period of time.'
14
Although the use of area warrants would entail some administrative in-
convenience for law enforcement officers, inconvenience alone is not
adequate reason for abrogating the warrant requirement. Nor would
the inconvenience of such a procedure "frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search.'
149
A warrant requirement would provide a crucial safeguard against
overreaching governmental action by interposing between the Border
Patrol and the individual an impartial magistrate who would determine
when, where, how long and to what extent searches may be conducted.
In considering his decision to issue a warrant, a magistrate would weigh
several factors: 1) the frequency that illegal aliens are reasonably be-
144. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970).
146. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 282-85 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring). This technique was, in dictum, approved by a majority of the Justices
and therefore may be indicative of how the law in this area is likely to develop. Id.
at 285-89 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J, and Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.).
147. Id. at 275 (Powell, I., concurring).
148. Id. at 283.
149. Id. quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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lieved to be transported across a particular area near the border; 2)
the proximity of that area to the border; 3) the topography of the area;
and 4) the possible interference with individual rights when the search
is viewed as a whole. 150 In addition, the magistrate could draw the
warrants to authorize the searches in an area for only a limited period
of time. Experience drawn from an initial search or series of searches
over a limited period of time would be highly relevant in considering
applications for renewal of a warrant.151
The determination of whether a warrant should be issued for an
area, then, would require the court to balance the legitimate interests
of law enforcement with an individual's Fourth Amendment rights prior
to the search.- 52 Such a determination would necessarily be made, as
prescribed by the Fourth Amendment, by a neutral and detached mag-
istrate instead of being decided by the officer "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."' 53  Such a procedure
seems preferable to that advocated by those opposing the extension of
Almeida-Sanchez to fixed and temporary checkpoint searches. The
opponents argue that the reasonableness of a search "should be deter-
mined in the first instance by the trial court after hearing all of the evi-
dence."' 5 4 Such a procedure allows border agents to stop and search
motor vehicles at their complete discretion which, in the words of
Camara
is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have
consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested
party warrant the need to search.' 55
Justice Powell, as well as the majority in Almeida-Sanchez, failed
to consider the extent to which evidence obtained in immigration
searches may be used in other types of criminal prosecutions. Such
a consideration is important since the majority of cases arising under
the Border Patrol's search for aliens result in prosecutions for violations
of the narcotics laws.' 56
One solution to this problem would be to allow the introduction
of evidence found during inland checkpoint searches in criminal prose-
150. Id. at 283-84 (Powell, J., concurring). In reviewing the search as a whole
the judge would consider the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and the concen-
tration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road or area.
151. Id. at 283 n.3.
152. Id. at 284.
153. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966), quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
154. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 973 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wallace, J., dis-
senting).
155. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967).
156. Sutis, The Extent of the Border, 1 HAST. CON. LAW. Q. 235, 249 (1974).
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cutions for crimes related to illegal entry while barring the introduction
of such evidence in prosecutions for other crimes. Such a rule would
allow heavy penalties to be inflicted on the basis of searches conducted
without probable cause in certain cases, but at least it would prevent
federal agents from using area warrants to pursue other law enforce-
ment goals under the guise of searching for aliens. Such a solution
would destroy the dual nature of the border agents authority since dis-
covery of evidence of violation of the narcotics laws would not be ad-
missible in a prosecution for transporting illegal aliens. Lower federal
courts do not appear willing to allow such an erosion of the border
agents' authority. Even in light of the Almeida-Sanchez decision, courts
have held that once a vehicle has been validly stopped for an immigra-
tion search, if immigration officers, in the course of searching for aliens,
detect circumstances supporting the belief that the customs laws are be-
ing violated, the officers may "don their customs hats" and complete
the search for contraband.
157
Another possible solution to the problem would be to ensure that
the warrants would be drawn in a manner which limits the scope of
the search to areas in which aliens reasonably could hide. This would
preclude the agents from searching glove compartments or under seats
on the pretext of looking for illegal aliens. Similarly, imposing strict
time limitations upon warrants would curtail the number of exhaustive
stops and searches under the guise of searching for illegal aliens.
158
Finally, if a magistrate realizes that the sole reason behind and the re-
sult of a warrant is the apprehension of narcotics law violators, the issu-
ance of the warrant should be denied altogether.
Conclusion
Fixed and temporary checkpoint searches of persons and property
inland from the border involve a tension between this country's right
to protect itself from the illegal entrance of persons or contraband and
the individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The inconvenience of being required at the border to state
one's place of birth and to declare what objects are being brought into
this country is minimal and the procedure appears to be reasonable in
light of the opposing interests of the individual and the government.
However, protection of individual rights demands imposition of a limit
on the blanket permission which Congress and the courts may afford
to the Border Patrol to invade one's privacy at checkpoints inland from
157. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 483 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thompson, 475
F.2d 1359, 1364 (5th Cir. 1973).
158. Stis, The Extent of the Dorder, 1 HAST, CONsT. L.Q. 235, 250 (1974).
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the border. In order to proceed further and actually search an automo-
bile for illegal aliens, there must be more than mere suspicion on the
part of border agents that a crime might be taking place. Otherwise,
many innocent people are subject to arbitrary search and undue incon-
venience, particularly if a customs official reacts negatively to a particu-
lar person's attitudes or appearance, orders a search and thus abuses
his discretion.
It appears that the lower federal courts still adhere to the "two-
hats" theory of the border agents' authority which allows an agent to
act both as an immigration and customs agent. Yet courts are begin-
ning to realize that the law concerning fixed and temporary checkpoint
searches must be brought into harmony with Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples. Analysis reveals that such searches cannot be justified by anal-
ogy to other types of searches which the United States Supreme Court
has condoned when based upon less than traditional probable cause.
Although the use of area warrants could provide a solution to inland
border search problems, careful consideration of factors related to the
issuance of such warrants and the extent to which customs officials will
be allowed to search for contraband during an area warrant search will
be required to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements.
Mr. Justice Jackson, upon his return from the Nuremberg trials,
stated:
These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensible free-
doms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing
a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror
in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first
and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary gov-
ernment.159
The power of the Border Patrol to search and seize motor vehicles at
fixed and temporary checkpoints inland from the border has for too
long remained uncontrolled. Subjecting such searches to the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment will reaffirm our commitment to the
supremacy of the rights of the individual as guaranteed by the Consti-
tution.
159. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
W'mter 19751 BORDER SEARCHES REVISITED

